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Abstract: 
 
This article examines the range of threats, both domestic and international, currently 
facing Dubai and its umbrella federal state – the United Arab Emirates.  An 
assessment is made of the UAE’s defensive capabilities, within the context of the Abu 
Dhabi-led and western-supplied UAE Armed Forces, followed by a discussion of the 
numerous regional disputes and conflicts that continue to involve the UAE, notably 
those concerning Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.  Finally, the internal threat is 
considered, by investigating both the UAE’s historical and contemporary role as a 
hub for criminal organisations and, perhaps most worryingly, its volatile relationship 
with various terrorist groups and the potential menace posed by organised terrorism 
to Dubai’s fragile foreign investment-dependent economy. 
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Dubai and the United Arab Emirates: Security Threats 
 
Christopher M. Davidson
1
 
 
 
 
The federation of United Arab Emirates has emerged as one of the Arab 
Gulf’s most successful post-oil states.  With political stability guaranteed by highly 
resilient, dynamic, and popular traditional monarchies,
2
 the UAE has been able to 
press forward with developing a diverse economic base that up until the global credit 
crunch enjoyed strong rates of growth and boasted an impressive track record in 
attracting foreign direct investment.  By 2008 the UAE’s second largest constituent 
emirate, Dubai, was drawing over 97 percent of its GDP from non-oil sectors,
3
 
including a real estate industry, a world class luxury tourism industry, an international 
financial centre, and a range of re-exporting and other commercial activities based out 
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of international ‘free zones’.4  While the real estate bubble has now burst and there 
has been an overextension of leisure and tourism megaprojects, Dubai and its 
neighbouring emirates have historically confounded their critics, and are likely to 
rebound when the international conditions improve.  However, long term investor 
confidence in these strategies remains in question given the UAE’s awkward 
geographic location close to regional hot spots, and given the rising level of other 
security concerns, both external and internal.  Should such threats escalate, and ever 
directly or indirectly involve the UAE, then the federation’s carefully cultivated 
reputation for political and economic stability would likely decline, thereby severely 
impacting upon its fragile foreign investment-dependent development trajectory. 
 
As the first section of this article will demonstrate, the UAE’s wealthiest 
emirate, Abu Dhabi, has built up the UAE Armed Forces in recent decades by 
procuring some of the finest military hardware available.  This has placed the UAE in 
a much stronger position, especially with the menace of Iraq having subsided since 
Saddam Hussein’s fall in 2003.  Nevertheless, the UAE’s defensive capabilities are 
either insufficient or inappropriate for countering remaining regional threats from Iran 
or, to a lesser extent, other Arab states.  As such, the federation has had little option 
but to remain under a western military umbrella.  This not only undermines the 
UAE’s current preference for neutrality, but also may weaken the legitimacy of a 
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 3 
federal government that has traditionally sought close relations with the Arab 
nationalist republics and the Arab League.
 4 
Moreover, as an unfortunate but perhaps inescapable hidden cost of its emergence as 
the region’s premier free port, for many years Dubai has attracted the attention of both 
international criminal and terrorist organisations, many of which have exploited the 
emirate’s laissez-faire attitudes and impressive physical infrastructure5 to set up 
various smuggling, gunrunning, human trafficking, and money laundering 
operations.
6
  Most significantly, despite Dubai’s undoubted usefulness to such groups, 
the final section of this article will reveal that the UAE has been unable to remain 
completely in the eye of the storm and has suffered from a number of terrorist attacks 
on its own soil. 
 
 
Military Power 
 
 The first formal security force tasked with protecting the sheikhdoms of the 
lower Gulf was set up in the late 1950s.  By the late 1960s, the British-officered 
Trucial Oman Scouts (previously known as Levies) were being funded almost 
exclusively by Abu Dhabi, as its oil revenues began to accumulate.
7
  Britain had 
anticipated that all regional divisions of the scouts would be amalgamated into one 
unified force following her withdrawal from the lower Gulf in 1971.  However, the 
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newly independent - albeit federated - emirates preferred to set up their own security 
organisations.  By the end of the year the Dubai Defence Force had 500 men and had 
purchased a number of patrol boats, fighter aircraft, and tanks.
8
  Although by the late 
1970s the DDF had approximately doubled in size, its commanders accepted that it 
was impractical to create a full scale army and thus they preferred to concentrate on 
buying high quality equipment so that Dubai would have a lightly armed task force 
capable of rapid deployment in the event of emergency.
9
  As such, by the time that the 
DDF was finally absorbed by Abu Dhabi’s much larger Union Defence Force in the 
mid-1990s, it had become a small but well-trained force with a tightly organised 
structure (including a specific women’s unit10) and superior hardware.  
Problematically, however, given that Dubai had been procuring equipment 
independently of Abu Dhabi for over 25 years, this meant that the newly reinforced 
and genuinely federal UAE Armed Forces was made up of largely incompatible 
hardware and munitions.  Perhaps as a symbol of autonomy, for much of the 1980s 
Dubai had been sourcing its armaments from the USSR, North Korea,
11
 and other 
Warsaw pact suppliers, whereas Abu Dhabi had been dealing almost exclusively with 
Western European and North American manufacturers.  Even more incongruous was 
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 6 
the equipment used by the various other emirate-level defence forces which had 
followed Dubai’s lead and had also agreed to integrate.  Most remarkably, the ruling 
families of Umm al-Qawain and Ajman offered the UAE Armed Forces the services 
of their predominantly untrained retainers armed with little more than antiquated 
rifles.
12
 
 
 Given the task of phasing out such mismatched weaponry and upgrading Abu 
Dhabi’s existing stocks, the UAE Armed Forces’ chiefs of staff since this period have 
secured military budgets of between $2 and $2.5 billion per annum,
13
 have expanded 
their personnel to over 55,000,
14
 and have frequently managed to gain permission 
from western governments to purchase the most sophisticated armaments – most of 
which are normally restricted to NATO allies.
15
  In particular, the UAE Armed Forces 
has procured $3 billion worth of Leclerc main battle tanks from France’s Nexter 
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corporation.
16
  Interestingly, given that the custom-made UAE versions have 
additional armour and upgraded guns for desert conditions, they are actually superior 
to the French Army’s Leclercs.  In addition, the DDF’s old Russian-manufactured 
BMP-3 armoured personnel carriers have largely been replaced by about 100 Turkish-
supplied Savunma Sistemleri carriers.  Courtesy of France’s Sagem Défense Sécurité, 
individual soldiers will soon be benefiting from modular infrared units that will allow 
improved battlefield navigation between men.  Moreover, the UAE Armed Forces’ 
artillery capabilities have been greatly enhanced following the purchase of howitzers 
from South Africa’s Denel corporation and from the Royal Netherlands Army.  
Similarly, the UAE’s air force has taken delivery of a large quantity of advanced 
equipment, including French-supplied Mirage 2000-9s complete with laser targeting 
pods and precision-guided missiles, British Aerospace Hawk 128s, Sikorsky Black 
Hawk helicopters, and about 30 Apache AH64 gunships.
17
  Furthermore, given the 
UAE’s recent involvement in several international peacekeeping operations,18 its air 
force has needed to improve its long range capabilities and has duly begun to acquire 
a number of heavy airlift carriers from the Ukraine.  Most notably, the UAE Armed 
Forces’ massive purchase of 80 F16E Desert Falcons in 2004 has made the UAE one 
of Lockheed Martins’ best customers.19  A few dozen of these have already arrived at 
Abu Dhabi’s Al-Dhafrah airbase, and over the next few years the arrival of the 
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remainder should make the UAE’s air force the second most advanced in the Middle 
East, after Israel.
20
  
 
 Unlike most other militaries in the developing world, the UAE Armed Forces 
has committed itself heavily to purchasing custom-made equipment manufactured by 
joint ventures between western arms companies and domestic enterprises.  With the 
reasoning that such products will be better suited to combat conditions in the Middle 
Eastern theatre, while also promoting the diversification of the economy and 
generating employment across the federation, the strategy would seem to have found 
much favour in both government and industry circles.  Specifically, in cooperation 
with a German company, the UAE has begun to manufacture its own military 
motorcycles and its new Guardian jeeps.  Similarly, the air force has commissioned a 
project to produce the ‘Mako’ light aircraft to be used for desert reconnaissance, and 
has consulted with a British company over the development of Al-Hakeem precision 
guided missiles, and with the European MBDA Corporation over the design of UAE-
specific Black Shaheen cruise missiles.
21
  Although the UAE’s navy has historically 
been small, with only one marine battalion and one naval squadron, and of less 
immediate concern than the army or air force, it would appear that the same 
collaborative strategy is being applied.  As part of the UAE Armed Forces’ ‘Project 
Baynunah,’ in conjunction with a French manufacturer and the new Abu Dhabi 
Shipbuilding Company, a number of new frigates and corvettes in addition to some 
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 9 
small amphibious craft and two-person mini submarines are under construction at 
Abu Dhabi’s Mussafah facility, and should be delivered by 2009.22 
 
 With the UAE Armed Forces’ main priority being improved defence, these 
land, air, and naval procurements will soon be complemented by far more advanced 
attack warning systems.  In particular, a large underground airbase is under 
construction somewhere in the southern desert of Abu Dhabi.  This will have a 
hardened shelter to allow the air force to survive a direct assault
23
 and will be able to 
link up with an integrated electronic warfare system supplied by Northrop Grumman 
and a number of newly acquired airborne early warning and control aircrafts 
(AWACs) provided by Boeing.  In addition, underwater surveillance systems are 
being installed at most of the UAE’s naval bases, courtesy of the German Konigsberg 
corporation, and the UAE Armed Forces will soon benefit from strategic data from a 
new Space Reconnaissance Centre that is located somewhere in Abu Dhabi and has 
access to Russian and North Korean satellite feeds.
24
 
 
The Western Security Umbrella 
 
 Despite the absorption of various emirate-level armed forces and several 
expensive upgrades, the UAE’s military strength remains weak.  There is considerable 
concern that the UAE Armed Forces has insufficient personnel with the necessary 
training to operate such sophisticated hardware.  Moreover, there is a fear that given 
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the financially privileged backgrounds of most UAE nationals, most of those 
employed by the UAE Armed Forces would not actually stand their ground in the 
event of combat.  Indeed, given that military salaries are often much lower than other 
incomes, especially those derived from family businesses and landlordship, a career in 
the armed forces is often looked upon as a source of additional status rather than as a 
source of livelihood.  Thus, for lower and middle-ranking servicemen, military 
misconduct would not lead to complete socioeconomic destruction.  Perhaps most 
worryingly, however, as with many other public sector professions in the UAE, 
including the civil service and the police, there are thought to be a growing number of 
expatriates employed by the UAE Armed Forces.  Certainly, of the 55,000 military 
personnel, it has been estimated that over 15,000 are foreigners, most of whom are 
Yemenis and Egyptians.
25
  Understandably this has led to much disquiet over the 
dependency on mercenaries who cannot be relied upon to the same extent as 
indigenous professional soldiers.  
 
 As such, despite the obvious costs to their legitimacy resources, in particular 
their commitment to the Palestinian nation and other Arab and Muslim causes,
26
 the 
UAE’s ruling families have had little choice but to remain under the security umbrella 
of western militaries that are predominantly made up of non-Arab, non-Muslim 
personnel, and which are directed by governments that are in de facto alliance with 
Israel.  Most notably, France, which has been the UAE Armed Forces’ greatest arms 
supplier since the 1993 Leclerc deal, has agreed to deploy 75,000 troops to the UAE 
in the event of an emergency, and it is believed that Britain signed a similar defence 
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pact in the late 1990s, albeit without specifying exact troop numbers.
27
  Such 
arrangements have allowed the UAE Armed Forces to assume a more realistic 
delaying role
28
 – should UAE territory be invaded, they can serve to slow down 
hostile forces until superpower reinforcements arrive.   
 
 Since the declaration of the War on Terror in September 2001 and the 
subsequent American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the UAE, or more exactly 
Dubai with its advanced infrastructure, has been able to provide the western militaries 
with an important regional base for their operations.  Although never publicly 
supporting the United States on the same scale as Qatar and Bahrain, which between 
them house an entire airwing of the US Air Force and the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet, in 
addition to a CIA base and an array of US special forces living in compounds,
29
 the 
UAE has nevertheless discreetly made many of its facilities available and will soon 
host a permanent French military base.  Ironically given the US Congress’ hostility to 
the Dubai Ports World Company’s attempted takeover of a number of US ports in 
early 2006,
30
 Dubai’s ports have proved indispensable in the War on Terror.  Notably, 
in mid-2006 George Bush stated that ‘…the UAE is a key partner for our navy in a 
critical region, and outside of our own country Dubai services more of our own ships 
than any other country in the world.’  Similarly, US Rear Admiral Michael Millar 
commented on the takeover fiasco by declaring that ‘…in a sense Dubai Ports World 
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has already been responsible for American security because we dock here in Dubai, 
and from personal experience I can confirm they are wonderfully efficient.’31  In 
particular it is thought that Port Jebel Ali is the US Navy’s most highly visited liberty 
port, with warships such as the USS John Kennedy regularly being refuelled or being 
serviced in Dubai’s dry docks,32 which remains one of only two ship repair yards in 
the Gulf.
33
  It has been estimated that around 4000 US sailors come ashore at Jebel 
Ali each year, with many revealing in anonymous US Navy surveys that Dubai is 
their favourite stop-off location due to the availability of alcohol and nightclubs.
34
  
Moreover, Jebel Ali together with Port Rashid also serve as major transit hubs for US 
military goods, with most such freight being delivered by three inconspicuous 
European shipping companies.
35
  On a lesser, but still significant scale, Fujairah’s 
deep water port on the UAE’s Indian Ocean coastline is also used by the US Navy, 
with the emirate’s major hotels even having a longstanding arrangement to bloc-let 
many of their rooms to Navy personnel,
36
 in much the same way as some of Abu 
Dhabi’s hotels, which have on occasion billeted US soldiers on leave from Iraq.37  
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 The use of air infrastructure has also proved to be a key area of cooperation, 
with Dubai International Airport’s Terminal 2 having probably become the busiest 
airport involved in the War on Terror, while the newer 1998-built Rashid Terminal 1 
has been allowed to concentrate on servicing Dubai’s more wholesome tourist, 
business, and transit flights.  Significantly, Terminal 2 is one of the few airports in the 
world that has regular flights to Baghdad and Kabul - offered by African Express, Al-
Ishtar, Jupiter, and other somewhat low-key airlines.  While some of the passengers 
are Iraqis or Afghanis hoping to visit their relatives, the bulk of the $400 seats are 
reserved for US military personnel or for employees of big contractors such as 
Halliburton.  Also lucrative have been Terminal 2’s war-related freight facilities, with 
cargo space on such flights selling for about $2 per kilo, and with many commercial 
companies shipping US military goods (including armoured vehicles) via the 
terminal.  It has been alleged that US military personnel have been working out of the 
airport offices of a major multinational courier company so as to bypass Dubai’s 
customs’ regulations and thereby smooth the clearance process for such goods.  On a 
more formal level, Abu Dhabi has made available its airbase in Al-Dhafrah to the US 
Air Force and to the CIA, with RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned reconnaissance aircraft 
being stationed there and with KC-10 tanker aircraft using the base to support 
operations in Afghanistan.  Embarrassingly, in the summer of 2005 it was revealed 
that U2 aircraft were also being serviced in Al-Dhafrah, following the crash landing 
of one of the spy planes on its return to Abu Dhabi from a mission in Afghanistan.  
The incident prompted the US Air Force to confirm that its 380
th
 Air Expeditionary 
Wing had been based there since 2002.
38
  In total, it is thought that there are currently 
over 100 US military personnel stationed in Al-Dhafrah.
39
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Iran – A History of Threats 
 
 Dubai has historically enjoyed fairly warm relations with Iran, given that 
many of its immigrant merchants are of Persian origin.  Iran has also long been the 
emirate’s principal regional trading partner and Dubai chose to remain neutral in the 
Iran-Iraq War.
40
  Nevertheless, for the federation as whole, the greatest external threat 
since its inception - and therefore the UAE Armed Forces’ greatest fear - has always 
been an attack from Iran.  Spanning over a century and three very different eras of 
Persian and Iranian administration, a number of islands belonging to Sharjah and Ra’s 
al-Khaimah – the UAE’s third and fourth most populous emirates - have been claimed 
and counter-claimed, and remain a source of great dispute between the UAE and Iran.  
Worryingly, the largest of these islands is less than 60 miles from downtown Dubai, 
and is currently occupied by Iranian military personnel.  In many ways the UAE’s 
most recent efforts to solidify its western military umbrella and to improve its War on 
Terror collaboration have exacerbated this risk as the US continues to challenge 
Tehran over its domestic energy policies.   
 
 During the mid-1880s, the Qajari Persian government expanded its influence 
to the southern coast of Iran and its soldiers occupied the formerly Arab-controlled 
mainland towns of Lingah, Junj, and Luft, in addition to several Arab inhabited 
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islands in the lower Gulf, including Qishm and Sirri.
41
  Importantly, four smaller but 
strategically located islands close to the Straits of Hormuz remained in Arab hands 
following a British warning delivered to Tehran.
42
  Even so, by the end of the 
nineteenth century Persia had renewed its claims to Henjam, Abu Musa, Tunb al-
Kuhbra and Tunb al-Sughra,
43
 with Britain finally appearing to acknowledge the 
Qajari’s new sphere of influence.   
 
By the late 1930s, with Persia’s name changed to Iran, with nationalist 
sentiments running high, and with Britain concentrating on developments in Nazi 
Germany, Reza Shah was encouraged to switch his ambitions to Bahrain – a much 
greater prize.  His son, Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, maintained pressure on 
Bahrain for many more years following his Anglo-Soviet assisted succession during 
the Second World War, stating in his own book, ‘Mission of My Country’, that his 
divine purpose was to be the saviour of both Iran and the Gulf.
44
  By the late 1960s, 
during the period of federal negotiations preceding British withdrawal, the Iranian 
Foreign Ministry even claimed that ‘Iran has always been opposed to colonialism in 
all forms, and the so-called federation of the Gulf emirates, by annexing the island of 
Bahrain to it, is considered a matter which cannot be acceptable to the Iranian 
government.’45  However, by the time of Bahrain’s declaration of independence in 
                                                 
41
 Ibid. p.72. 
42
 John B. Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1968), pp.92-93; Al-Gurg, The Wells of Memory, p.5. 
43
 Al-Gurg, The Wells of Memory, p.5. 
44
 Wilson, Rashid’s Legacy, p.260. 
45
 Ibid. p.295. 
 16 
mid-1971 and its concurrent international recognition,
46
 Iran had little choice but to 
return its attention to the lower Gulf, with Abu Musa being regarded as the most 
attractive consolation prize.
47
  Ominously, Tehran informed Britain that it must stop 
flying over the area, and when Britain uncharacteristically complied
48
 there was 
considerable concern that a secret deal had been struck in which Iran would be 
allowed to occupy the island when Britain finally left the Gulf.
49
  During the months 
preceding the formation of the UAE in late 1971 such rumours gathered pace, fuelled 
by news of Britain’s completion of the sale of over $200 million worth of Chieftain 
tanks to Iran, and confirmed by a British envoy’s instruction to the rulers that they 
should negotiate directly with Iran.
50
 
 
 Reportedly rejecting an offer of over $30 million,
51
 the Qawasim rulers of 
Sharjah and Ra’s al-Khaimah refused Iran’s proposed compensations,52 and Iran duly 
                                                 
46
 Davidson, Dubai, p.63. 
47
 Wilson, Rashid’s Legacy, pp.90,295,332. 
48
 Ibid. pp.325-326. 
49
 Such rumours had begun in Ra’s al-Khaimah earlier in the 1960s.  See Donald 
Hawley, The Emirates: Witness to a Metamorphosis (Norwich: Michael Russell, 
2007), pp.188-190. 
50
 Britain’s special envoy was the former British Political Resident in the Gulf, Sir 
William Luce.  It was reported that Luce even brought an Iranian military official 
with him on his visits to the rulers of Sharjah and Ra’s al-Khaimah.  Richard A. 
Mobley, ‘The Tunbs and Abu Musa Islands: Britain’s Perspective,’ Middle East 
Journal, 57:4 (2003), pp.628-644; Wilson, Rashid’s Legacy, pp.325-236. 
51
 Mobley, ‘The Tunbs,’ pp.628-644. 
 17 
invaded Abu Musa along with both of the Tunb islands on the eve of Britain’s 
departure.  Muhammad Reza Shah claimed this was a necessary action to prevent any 
‘unfriendly power’ from gaining control of the Straits.53  Following a brief struggle 
involving some fatalities, the ruler of Sharjah
54
 reluctantly agreed to allow Iran to 
establish permanent bases on certain parts of Abu Musa in exchange for a financial 
aid package of nine annual payments of about $2 million.
55
  Importantly, the more 
resolute ruler of Ra’s al-Khaimah56 refused to come to an agreement over the Tunb 
islands, and the UAE duly reported all three islands to the United Nations, requesting 
international arbitration.  Since the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council in 
1981 the liberation of these territories has remained a central component of the six 
members’ foreign policy objectives, however in many ways Iran has managed to 
extend its control even further.
57
  Notably, in 1992 Iran reneged on its 1971 deal with 
Sharjah, as Revolutionary Guards began to encroach further on Abu Musa’s towns, 
requesting all UAE nationals to obtain Iranian entry visas.
58
  In 1995 Iran forcibly 
required all residents to exit and then return through the island’s Iranian port, and has 
since then prevented teachers and other UAE public sector employees from re-
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entering.
59
  Ominously, Iran has now also opened an airport, has built a town hall, is 
constructing a university, and conducts numerous naval exercises in nearby waters.
60
   
 
 Today, further instability and skirmishes in the vicinity of the islands remain 
likely should a beleaguered Iranian presidency need to rebuild national pride.  This 
could hamper both Dubai and Sharjah’s oil exports, especially given the close 
proximity of Sharjah’s remaining Mubarak offshore oilfield.  Moreover, despite the 
federal government’s attempts to balance the United States and Iran by inviting 
delegations from both countries to the UAE in the summer of 2007, by declaring to 
the international media that ‘UAE territories will never be used for security, 
intelligence, or military operations directed against Iran,’61 and by dispatching groups 
of sympathetic fact-finding clergy to Qom in Iran; any stray anti-ship missiles or 
Iranian submarine activity in the event of a US-Iran conflict would nonetheless raise 
tanker insurance rates and thereby greatly harm the UAE’s economy.62  Lastly, it is 
also important to note that invasion itself, or missile strikes against targets on UAE 
soil are not an impossibility.  Certainly, there exists a certain optimism in the UAE 
that the United States will eventually reach something of a ‘grand bargain’ with Iran, 
as the Americans cannot afford to allow the economies of the Gulf emirates to falter, 
especially those such as Dubai’s that are now so heavily reliant on foreign direct 
investment, much of which originates from the West.  Importantly, this line of 
thinking grossly underestimates the UAE’s ultimate expendability should the United 
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States need to grapple with a state whose weapons may prevent long term regional 
stability. 
 
Other Regional Threats 
 
 OPEC quota disagreements during the 1980s and the invasion of Kuwait in 
1990 led to considerable tension between the UAE and Iraq, with many fearing 
invasion.
63
  However, the Anglo-American enforced regime change in Iraq in 2003 
has significantly reduced the UAE’s fear of hostilities from Iraq.  Over the past three 
years the UAE Armed Forces has donated much equipment to the new Iraqi military, 
including several Bell 206 helicopters, and in a further gesture of friendship has 
provided training for hundreds of Iraqi policemen and other security officials on UAE 
soil.
64
  Similarly, occasional threats from other Arab Gulf states have now all but 
disappeared, with the last serious dispute with Oman being resolved in 1989 when the 
ruler of Dubai
65
 stepped in to mediate a disagreement between Muscat and Ra’s al-
Khaimah over the sovereignty of the Musandam Peninsula that was on the verge of 
escalating into armed conflict.
66
 
 
 Most significantly, the UAE’s long history of tension with Saudi Arabia now 
also appears to have abated.  Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
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the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai had resisted the encroachment attempts of the 
same Wahhabi-inspired Saudis
67
 that had managed to gain influence in Ra’s al-
Khaimah and Sharjah.
68
  Crucially, by the early 1950s, the US concession holder for 
Saudi oil, ARAMCO, was urging its host nation to renew its historical claims to parts 
of the lower Gulf, especially the towns surrounding the Buraimi oasis, where it had 
assumed there were large onshore oil deposits.  ARAMCO devoted all of its scholarly 
resources to proving the legitimacy of the Saudi claim, not least by demonstrating that 
the tribesmen of the area, including those inhabiting the Abu Dhabi-administered 
town of Al-Ayn, had for centuries paid religious tax to Saudi sheikhs.
69
  Following a 
failed peace conference in Damman in late 1952, a Saudi envoy
70
 arrived in Hamasa, 
another of the Buraimi towns, with an armed force laden with money, food, and 
presents for the local sheikhs.  To reinforce further the Saudi position, it was reported 
that the envoy even married the daughter of the sheikh of one of the most powerful 
Buraimi tribes.
71
  Although the Trucial Oman Levies were deployed and the Saudis 
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were expelled, with the envoy being shot by a British officer,
72
 no real solution was 
reached between the two parties.  Just three years later Saudi Arabia was accused of 
paying for the assassination of the Abu Dhabi ruler,
73
 and in 1959 Saudi Arabia 
vigorously protested over Abu Dhabi’s establishment of a police outpost on the 
disputed Khor al-Udaid.
74
 
 
 Remarkably, when the UAE was formed in 1971 Saudi Arabia refused to 
acknowledge its existence, and only granted it recognition in 1974 when Abu Dhabi 
finally agreed to give up Khor al-Udaid in addition to the islands of Khor Duwayham 
and Huwayat, thereby providing Saudi Arabia with a corridor of land to the lower 
Gulf between Qatar and Abu Dhabi.  Ironically, while oil has never been discovered 
in the Buraimi region, this conceded territory is now home to the Shaiba and Zarara 
oilfields, and is therefore one of Saudi Arabia’s most resource rich provinces.75  
Importantly, given that this 1974 treaty was never officially registered, there remains 
some concern even today that the new generation of Abu Dhabi rulers may attempt to 
challenge Saudi Arabia over the agreement.
76
  Most maps produced in Abu Dhabi 
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today depict the UAE with its pre-1974 Saudi border,
77
 perhaps indicating a 
willingness to re-open the dispute.  Nevertheless, since the formation of the GCC and 
the emergence of greater mutual threats, Saudi Arabia, much like Iraq, has become 
less likely to threaten the UAE again.  Indeed, the greatest threat that Saudi Arabia 
now poses to the UAE is one of internal regime failure – should Saudi Arabia falter, 
the military bulwark of the GCC would collapse. 
 
Domestic Vulnerabilities – A History of Terror 
 
Notwithstanding early anti-British movements such as the ‘Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Occupied Arab Gulf’ and some sporadic National Front-inspired 
violence in the 1950s,
78
 over the course of the second half of the twentieth century the 
UAE suffered several spates of serious terrorist attacks and other politically-motivated 
acts of violence on its own soil.  While in most cases the UAE has been a victim of 
cross-fire due to its unfortunate geographic location and its large expatriate 
population, it is important to note that a number of these incidents were also 
purposely intended to discredit the establishment and the ruling families, often by 
highlighting their close relationship with the West.
79
   
 
 The first organised attacks that were aimed at destabilising the lower and 
frightening both the British and the indigenous population were those launched by 
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Omani terrorists in the late 1950s and early 1960s; most of whom were supporting the 
Imam Ghalib against the government in Muscat,
80
 and many of whom would join the 
more conventional Dhofar Liberation Front later in the decade.  Crucially, it would 
seem that most of the protagonists were based in Dubai, as sympathisers provided 
them with safe houses and in some cases even British travel documentation, so that 
they could travel freely without their Omani papers.  Land mines were also stored in 
Dubai, seemingly in cars belonging to associates of both the ruler of Sharjah,
81
 and 
the eldest son of the ruler of Ajman.
82
  Shockingly, in 1959 a three ton lorry 
transporting Trucial Oman Scouts soldiers was blown up by one of these mines on the 
road between Dubai and Buraimi,
83
 and soon after a Land Rover was blown up in 
Buraimi itself.
84
  As panic spread, all motorists began to place sandbags on the 
fenders of their cars so as to better absorb such explosions.
85
  Throughout 1960 the 
terror attacks continued, and on one occasion a mine exploded on a private road 
belonging to the ruler of the informally recognised sheikhdom of Mahadha.
86
  Most 
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dramatically, in 1961 the Omani rebels struck at sea and became the perpetrators of 
one of the greatest acts of terrorism there has ever been in the Middle East.  The Dara 
was the flagship of the British India Steam Navigation Company and was carrying 
over 800 passengers from Bombay to Basra via Dubai.  When she was approaching 
the coast of Dubai two explosions ripped through her cabins, killing 212 passengers 
and 24 crew members.  Although British salvage vessels managed to tow the ship 
away, its burning hull eventually sank two days later off the coast of Umm al-
Qawain.
87
  Although the exact method of the attack remains unknown, the British 
agent surmised that timers had been set so that the bombs would explode upon the 
Dara’s arrival in Muscat and that bad weather had caused them to go off early.88  
Indeed, it later transpired that after planting their explosives the terrorists had left the 
ship when it berthed in Bahrain before eventually being captured in Oman.
89
 
 
 Disturbingly, although the Omani threat soon subsided, during the 1970s and 
1980s Dubai and the new UAE federation became something of an unwitting proxy 
battleground for other organised terror groups and freedom fighters that sought 
international publicity for their causes.  In 1973 a Japan Airlines jet en route from 
Amsterdam to Tokyo was jointly hijacked by members of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation and the Japanese Red Army.  After the new pirate captain redirected the 
aircraft to land in Dubai, a youthful Sheikh Muhammad bin Rashid Al-Maktum - the 
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ruler’s third son and at that time the commander of the DDF – opened 
communications with the terrorists from the airport control tower.  Having assumed 
that Muhammad would grant their release given the UAE’s international pro-
Palestinian stance, the hijackers soon realised their miscalculation and demanded to 
be refuelled.  With little choice, after three days of threat-laden negotiations 
Muhammad had to grant the aircraft safe passage to Libya where all of the hijackers 
were allowed to walk free.
90
  The following year a British Airways jet was hijacked 
by the PLO and also forced to land in Dubai, before being refuelled under similar 
circumstances.
91
  In 1977 the UAE faced an even more difficult year with a Gulf Air 
flight bound for Muscat being hijacked and landed by an unknown team of terrorists, 
with explosives being detonated in the offices of the Egyptian Airlines at Sharjah 
airport.
92
  And with a prominent Dubai national and the federal Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs
93
 being assassinated by gunmen while escorting the Syrian foreign 
minister to Abu Dhabi airport.
94
  Most dramatically, towards the end of 1977 the 
Baader-Meinhof Gang chose to fly their hijacked Lufthansa jet with 91 passengers on 
board to Rome and Bahrain, before finally demanding clearance from Dubai.  
Muhammad was again able to confront the terrorists, delaying their departure for over 
48 hours.
95
  Crucially, this allowed a German commando team to position themselves 
                                                 
90
 Wilson, Rashid’s Legacy, pp.358-360. 
91
 Merchant International Group Strategic Research and Corporate Intelligence (25 
August 2005). 
92
 Ibid. 
93
 Saif Said bin Ghubash. 
94
 Wilson, Rashid’s Legacy, p.431. 
95
 Ibid. pp.429-431. 
 26 
around Mogadishu airport where they stormed the jet upon its arrival in Somalia, 
killing all of the hijackers and releasing all of the hostages.  Six years later tragedy 
struck once more, when a hijacked Gulf Air flight from Abu Dhabi to Karachi 
exploded in mid-air somewhere close to Dubai,
96
 and in the following year the UAE’s 
ambassador to France
97
 was assassinated upon his arrival in Paris by unknown 
perpetrators.  The fear that this killing generated was enough to persuade the ruler of 
Dubai to finally have plain clothes bodyguards around him during public 
appearances.
98
  By the mid-1980s little had improved, with bombs being discovered 
onboard a Jordanian aircraft in Dubai in 1985, and with bombs exploding at the 
Syrian Airlines office at Abu Dhabi airport in 1986.  More recently, in the 1990s 
several foreign intelligence operatives were assassinated in the UAE, including an 
Iranian intelligence colonel.  And in early 1999 explosives were discovered in one of 
Dubai’s first large-scale shopping malls: Deira City Centre.99  Infamously, on the 
Christmas Eve of that year yet another aircraft was diverted to the emirate when 
Pakistani hijackers seized an Indian Airlines flight en route from Nepal to Delhi.  A 
hostage was murdered and thrown out of the plane when it reached Dubai, before the 
hijackers then flew to a warmer welcome in Kandahar.  The entire crisis (including 
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the tragedy in Dubai) became the subject of both a National Geographic Channel 
documentary and a Bollywood action movie.
100
   
 
Since then almost all terror-related incidents in Dubai and the UAE have had 
at least some connection to Al-Qaeda, or rather organisations purporting to be linked 
to Al-Qaeda.  Certainly, in addition to well documented money laundering services
101
 
and the personal involvement of UAE nationals in Al-Qaeda’s international attacks, 
including the Ra’s al-Khaimah national Marwan Al-Shehhi, and another of the 
September 11
th
 hijackers, Fayez Banihammad,
102
 there have also been persistent 
claims that the country has many key sympathisers, and is regularly used as a safe 
haven and a logistical base by various Al-Qaeda cells and other associated renegades.  
During the September 11
th
 Commission hearings the former US Secretary of 
Defence
103
 stated that in 1999 the witness reports of paid agents in Afghanistan had 
informed the CIA that Osama bin Laden had set up a large hunting camp in the desert 
of the Helmand province complete with marquees, generators, and refrigerators.  
Hoping to hit the suspected mastermind of the 1998 African embassy bombings, the 
Pentagon duly drew up plans for a cruise missile strike, but then had to abort the 
operation when it was learned that a C130 transport aircraft with UAE markings had 
landed at the camp’s airstrip.  According to CIA and Department of Defense officials, 
US decision makers were concerned that such an attack might compromise a UAE 
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sheikh or other senior UAE official.
104
  Tellingly, the former CIA director later 
testified that if the strike had gone ahead ‘…it might have wiped out half of the UAE 
royal family in the process’, while others testified that ‘…the United Arab Emirates 
was becoming… a persistent counterterrorism problem… as it was one of the 
Taleban's only travel and financial outlets to the outside world.’105 
 
 Significantly, although not touching on the widespread rumours that Osama 
Bin Laden himself had been receiving medical treatment in Dubai during the summer 
of 2001,
106
 the Commission nevertheless also reported that most of the September 11
th
 
hijackers had flown to the United States via the UAE.  It was claimed that 11 Al-
Qaeda men of Saudi origin, the presumed ‘muscle’ for the operation, had travelled in 
groups of two or three from Dubai International Airport between April and June of 
that year.
107
  In November 2002 journalists then learned that the suspected ringleader 
of the team that had attacked the USS Cole off the coast of the Yemen in 2000 had 
been captured, but were only informed that the arrest had taken place in an 
undisclosed location in the Gulf.  In a good example of carefully timed 
announcements of sensitive information, it was only revealed a month later that a ‘top 
ten’ Al-Qaeda operative had been captured in Dubai.  Worryingly, it transpired that 
the Saudi suspect, Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, had been apprehended while in the final 
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planning stages of attacks on ‘vital economic targets’ in the UAE that were aiming to 
inflict ‘the highest possible casualties among nationals and foreigners.’108   Also in 
2002 various international reports were published indicating that hundreds of the Al-
Qaeda ‘volunteer soldiers’ that had been captured in Afghanistan were actually UAE 
nationals.
109
  Moreover, the reports claimed that a number of Dubai and Fujairah-
based ‘welfare associations’ had been sending money to radical groups in Afghanistan 
and South Asia, and had been encouraging young men to join terrorist groups.
110
  In 
2004 the perceived links between Dubai and Al-Qaeda were further strengthened by 
another round of high profile arrests, leading many to suspect these were merely the 
tip of the iceberg and that the emirate was still ‘playing a key role for Al-Qaeda as a 
through-point’ even three years after the September 11th attacks.111  Notably, after 
alleged pressure from the CIA, the Dubai authorities arrested and extradited Qari 
Saifullah Akhtar, the leader of the Pakistani Al-Qaeda splinter group Haraktul Jihad 
Islami, who was believed to be responsible for the training of thousands of militants 
in the Rishkor camp close to Kabul, and for carrying money and personal messages 
on behalf of Bin Laden.  Crucially, he had disappeared from Afghanistan and Pakistan 
just days before Anglo-American forces arrived in October 2001.
112
  Shortly 
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afterwards, the arrest in Pakistan of Al-Qaeda’s Ahmad Khalfan Ghailani, a suspect of 
the 1998 US embassy bombings, provided intelligence concerning two of his South 
African colleagues and ‘several other senior men’ who were all either travelling from 
the UAE to Pakistan or were based in the UAE at that time.
113
   
 
Domestic Vulnerabilities – The Present Threat 
 
 As few would dispute, despite the unrestrained development that has taken 
place in Dubai and elsewhere in the UAE, despite the necessary but often 
controversial socioeconomic reforms,
114
 and despite the close relationship with the 
West, there exists a certain overconfidence that little can go wrong and that somehow 
the country will remain aloof from acts of terror on its own doorstep.  Along with 
other Gulf states there have been accusations that various terrorist organisations have 
been ‘bought off’.115  In 2005 the struggling Iraqi President, Jalal Talabani, made dark 
references to the sources of the funding for his enemies, most conspicuously the 
insurgent leader Abu Musab Al-Zaraqawi.  Disturbingly, he stated that ‘…they are 
getting aid from Al-Qaeda and from some financiers among some extremist Muslim 
organisations abroad… and from countries that I will not name.’  Analysts agreed that 
these mystery countries were most likely to be the small Gulf states.
116
  With specific 
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regard to the UAE, it has similarly been claimed that a number of Islamist 
organisations, in addition to wealthy individuals, are supporting terror organisations 
financially.
117
  However, regardless of whether these payments are in genuine support 
of the causes or are simply protection money, it would seem unnecessary for the UAE 
to have to rely on such measures given that at present most groups continue to benefit 
from Dubai’s openness so long as they can operate in relative freedom and can use the 
city’s infrastructure for their own purposes.  Certainly, even if one does subscribe to 
the belief that there exists some kind of unwritten understanding that the authorities 
will turn a blind eye to questionable activities, or even if one accepts that Dubai 
unwittingly permits itself to be used as a logistical terror hub, these steps are unlikely 
ever to be enough to prevent splinter groups or disaffected individuals from acting 
unilaterally against an establishment that they undoubtedly perceive to be an ally of 
the western powers. 
 
 Over the last few years there have been a large number of threats made to 
Dubai and the UAE by hitherto unknown groups, many of which refer explicitly to 
the country’s dealings with the United States and its supporting role in the War on 
Terror.  Notably, in 2002 a letter signed by the previously unknown ‘Al-Qaeda 
Terrorist Organisation in the United Arab Emirates Government’ was intercepted by 
US intelligence services - it warned UAE officials to stop arresting Al-Qaeda’s 
‘mujahideen sympathisers’.  The letter concluded with a boast that ‘…you are well 
aware that we have infiltrated your security, censorship, and monetary agencies along 
with other agencies that should not be mentioned’, and demanded that the UAE ‘…get 
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the idolaters out.’118  Similarly, in 2003, following the Anglo-American invasion of 
Iraq an audio message was recorded by Al-Qaeda’s Saleh Al-Aloofi that sought to 
incite violence in all of the pro-western Gulf states, including the UAE, by stating 
‘…to the brothers of Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, the Emirates, and to all the lions of jihad 
in the countries neighbouring Iraq, every one of us has to attack what is available in 
his country of soldiers, vehicles, and airbases of the crusaders and the oil allocated for 
them.’119  Chillingly, since 2005 the frequency and severity of the threats would seem 
to have increased even further, with underground Islamist websites having publishing 
warnings that ‘Dubai is rapidly changing into a secular state… with the profound use 
of non-Islamic ways’;120 with Al-Qaeda representatives having notified the Dubai 
authorities that they had discovered both the USS Harry Truman and the USS John 
Kennedy berthed in Port Jebel Ali after they had been used to ‘bombard the Muslims 
in Iraq and Afghanistan’;121 with the US Embassy in Abu Dhabi and the US Consulate 
in Dubai having had to close temporarily due to bomb threats;
122
 and with another 
new group calling itself ‘The Al-Qaeda Organisation in the Emirates and Oman’ 
having issued a statement in July 2005 that called for the dismantling of all US 
military installations in the UAE within ten days, failing which ‘the ruling families 
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would endure the fist of the mujahideen in their faces.’123  As recently as June 2008, 
the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office raised its terror threat assessment for 
the UAE from medium to high, following a series of arrests and several weeks of 
intensified ‘chatter’ intercepted between UAE-based suspects.124 
 
Conclusion 
 
The UAE is now more vulnerable than ever before to uncontrollable external 
circumstances.  This is especially true given that the economic diversification 
strategies, while superficially successful in reducing the historical dependency on oil 
exports, have, if anything, intensified the dependency on foreign economies.  Notably, 
in the event of a crisis - whether a terrorist attack, an invasion, or close proximity to 
regional violence - many of the multinationals with regional branches in Jebel Ali, 
Dubai Internet City, Dubai Media City, and the various other free zones would most 
likely withdraw their personnel and close their operations, and would think carefully 
about returning afterwards.  Given the success of Dubai’s free zones, other regional 
cities have set up similar entities,
125
 and these are soon likely to position themselves 
as serious alternatives.  Problems in Dubai or elsewhere in the UAE would therefore 
lead to swift relocations for many companies that wished to maintain a Middle 
Eastern headquarters.  Similarly, international luxury tourists would be unlikely to 
continue visiting the UAE should its reputation wane as being a safe destination.  
Many of the European and North American tourists (who now make up nearly 40 
                                                 
123
 Personal correspondence (March 2007). 
124
 Financial Times (16 June 2008). 
125
 Jordan’s Aqaba free zone was set up in 2000. 
 34 
percent of all visitors to Dubai
126
) who choose their holidays from high street travel 
agency brochures do not really consider Dubai to be part of the Middle East.  But if 
there were to be negative publicity, this misconception would swiftly change.  
Certainly in October 2001 most of Dubai’s five star hotels were empty following the 
US invasion of Afghanistan, with even the iconic Burj Al-Arab having had its power 
cut off temporarily due to zero occupancy.  Tellingly, 2001 was the only year that the 
total number of visitors to Dubai did not increase, despite the sector’s strong 
performance in the months prior to September 11
th
.
127
  Given the much greater and 
more diverse population of tourists today, it is likely that demand would be even more 
elastic should there be a future problem that more directly concerns the UAE, 
especially as there are many alternative winter sun resorts, most of which offer 
arguably far superior cultural and historical attractions than those of the lower Gulf.  
Similarly, should confidence in Dubai’s real estate sector be shaken by internal or 
external threats, then a significant proportion of foreign investors would cease further 
payments and would probably try to sell their deposits, preferring to cut their losses.  
In much the same way as the emerging competition from new free zones, other 
developing states are now beginning to adopt elements of Dubai’s real estate industry 
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in an attempt to emulate its success.
128
  Should the pioneer stumble these are likely to 
provide attractive alternative venues for international property investors. 
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